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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically investigates the connection between 
corruption and crime. Such linkage has been often underestimated 
because corruption has been often analyzed as a white-collar crime. 
In fact it is not characterized by violence. Recently a theoretical 
connection has been suggested to highlight that corruption and crime 
can be considered strategic complements. This paper, therefore, 
delves into the link between corruption and crime investigating 
empirically this relation for Italian regions in the period 1996-2005. 
Results show that current crime is positively associated with past 
levels of corruption. This somehow confirms the complementary 
relationship between the two illicit phenomena.  
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Introduction 
 
Corruption has recently drawn attention of the economists. 
Although early analyses date back to 70s, only in the last decade 
several empirical models of corruption have been produced. 
However, in spite of this growing interest, a shared definition of 
corruption is still missing. McChesney (2010) defines corruption as 
“..governmental actor’s use of resources that nominally he does not 
own but he effectively does own, to enrich himself personally”. In 
other words, the author links the phenomenon of corruption to the 
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existence of a set of property rights owned by the government but in 
fact delegated to public officials. In this vein, in what follows, we 
define corruption as an illicit informal contract between a public 
bureaucrat and a private actor (namely a corruptor) in which the 
corrupted official accepts some monetary amount or other economic 
benefits from the second in order to concede discretionarily the 
exploitation of a specific right or some public funding. In this 
respect, corruption can be also defined as the illicit side of rent-
seeking.  
Economic studies on corruption mainly focus on the causes and 
consequences of corruption. Among these studies, one approach 
tries to find out how some institutional characteristics impact on 
corruption, while the second approach aims to single out the impact 
of corruption on the economy and, in particular on economic growth.  
In this paper, however, we are interested in another consequence of 
corruption, namely the impact of corruption on emergence of crime. 
Drawing a theoretical perspective from Kluger et al. (2005), we 
assume that corruption and crime can be considered strategic 
complements, and therefore we try to empirically investigate this 
relationship between crime and corruption. This theoretical model 
is grounded on the classical theory of crime developed by Becker 
(1968) that points out that rational individuals take into account 
the certainty and the severity of the expected sanctions and 
punishment. In other words, to assure an efficient legal 
enforcement, not only the cost of a given crime has to be high but 
also the criminal has to be aware that, if caught, he will be surely 
convicted. Taking this as pillar, Kluger et al. (2005) delve into the 
relationship between corruption and the severity of the penalty. The 
authors point out that in weak government environments, 
characterized by badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers and where 
corruption is pervasive, harsh sanctions and punishment not only 
do not suffice to deter crime but they also may lead to an increase in 
crime rates. According to the authors, further increases in the 
severity of the sanctions have the paradoxical effect of lowering the 
cost of corruption in comparison to its profitability. In other words, 
in the presence of harsher criminal sanctions, bribing a public 
official is more advantageous. Longer and harsher sentences alone, 
in fact, do not prevent individuals from committing crime but they 
may encourage these individuals to find a way-out from punishment 
throughout a bribe. This situation, however, causes a reduction in 
the efficiency of the judicial system and, consequently, an increase 
of crime rates. If corruption is widespread, in fact, criminals do not 
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perceive imprisonment as a predictable possibility and, therefore, 
the opportunity cost of committing crime decreases significantly. 
Our work draws insights from the previous theoretical study and 
empirically investigates on the relationship between crime and 
corruption in Italy in the period 1996-2005. The period embraces 
the socio-economic adaptation after the biggest corruption scandal 
in Italian history, namely the «Mani Pulite» inquiry which has been 
followed by a period of economic sluggishness emerged after the 
2001 financial crisis. In particular we estimate a panel data model 
with both random and fixed effects OLS estimators. The dependent 
variable is the current level of crime and the main explanatory 
variable is the past actual level of corruption measured as the 
actual number of public servants prosecuted for corruption. Results 
show a positive association between current level of crime and past 
level of corruption. The estimation is robust across different 
specifications including some control variables drawn from the 
prevailing literature on economic determinants of crime.  
In the end, the main novelty we would claim for this work is 
the empirical evidence of a robust association between past 
corruption and current level of crime. This brings to light a 
relationship between crime and corruption in line with the 
theoretical predictions expounded above. Stated succinctly, crime 
increases in the presence of corruption. In brief, this paper 
contributes to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on determinants of crime, with a special focus on Italy. 
Second we contribute to the growing literature which studies the 
detrimental impact of corruption on economic growth. In fact, 
unpacking the complementary relationship between corruption and 
crime let us to highlight another channel through which corruption 
could affect negatively economic growth. Needless to say, the 
negative relationship between crime and growth is undisputed in 
the economic literature of growth.   
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, we present data about 
crime and corruption in Italy detailing the peculiarities of the 
Italian case. Eventually, we set up a model to delve into the 
relationship between crime and corruption. In doing so, we ground 
on an established literature on determinants of crime. Thirdly we 
explore some non-linearities. Concluding remarks closeand 
highlight some lines for future research.    
 
Related literature on the consequences of corruption 
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The literature on corruption mainly probes into its causes and its 
consequences as carefully reviewed by Lambsdorff (2006). Among 
the causes it is possible to draw a distinction between political, 
institutional and social determinants of corruption. Goel and Nelson 
(2010) have widely studied the institutional and political features 
which may bring about corruption. They find out that both 
government size and its scope are positively correlated with 
corruption. On the other hand, the size of the public sector cannot 
be associated with corruption. 
However, the most debated issue about corruption is perhaps the 
impact that this phenomenon has on economic growth. On the one 
hand, it is maintained that in the presence of an inefficient 
bureaucratic system corruption contributes to “greasing the wheels 
of the system”. However, this hypothesis found very little support in 
empirical studies. Among others, Aidt (2009) shows that this idea is 
deeply unfounded.  
On the other hand, the great majority of the literature agrees that 
corruption is detrimental for economic growth of a country. The idea 
that high levels of corruption bring about a lower economic 
performance has been widely accepted [see among others Myrdal, 
(1989), Krueger (1974) Shleifer and Visny (1993)]. The main 
argument is that public officials delay the concession of a service on 
purpose of getting a bribe. The bribe creates an extra-cost for 
private and private citizens.  
However, despite the agreement on corruption slowing economic 
growth, there is still no consensus on how such detrimental impact 
takes shape. A growing strand of literature has been investigating 
the possibility that corruption hits the volume of the investments. 
In this view, corruption can be interpreted as a sort of tax which 
reduces the future returns of an investment and, consequently, it 
dissuades investors. Mauro (1995) finds out that corruption is 
negatively and significantly associated with the ratio of investment 
to GDP. These findings has been reinforced by Brunetti and Weder 
(1998) and Gymiah-Brempong (2002). 
Secondly, corruption brings about a misallocation of public 
expenditure towards less productive sectors and, at the same time, 
it reduces the quality of the public services. Above all, public 
expenditures in education are reduced. Mauro (1998) finds a 
negative and significant association between corruption  and public 
expenses in education. This result has been confirmed by the 
analysis of Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002) and Esty and 
Porter (2002).  
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In other words, as Caruso (2009) suggests, a corrupted bureaucracy 
has an interest in directing a large quota of public expenditure 
towards sectors, such as the sanitary system and public 
infrastructure, that provide larger rooms of rents. Mauro (1997) also 
suggests a positive association between corruption and public 
investments and Esty and Porter (2002) and Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997) theorize that corruption brings to over-investment in public 
infrastructure.  
Thirdly, corruption originates a loss of productivity. In fact, if profit-
making is perceived to depend on the favor of some corrupted public 
servants and not on the productive efficiency, entrepreneurs have 
fewer incentives to improve their productivity. This hypothesis has 
been confirmed by the analysis of Bandeira et al. (2001). These 
authors, grounding on the work of Burki and Perry (1998) and on 
the empirical model of Garcia et al (2001) investigate the 
association between factor productivity and corruption in a sample 
of 81 countries. They conclude that corruption negatively affects 
economic growth by reducing capital productivity.  
 In sum, the following analysis is an attempt to highlight 
another channel of detrimental impact of corruption on economic 
growth. The channel is an increase in crime rate. The association 
between crime and growth is undisputed because crime undermines 
the security of property rights and the confidence in the rule of law. 
They have been both proved to be crucial for long-run economic 
growth.  
 
 
The Data and the empirical specification 
 
As stated above, the main aim of our work is to study the 
association between crime and corruption in Italy. Therefore, in 
what follows, we present an empirical investigation on the effects of 
corruption on crime. Data are drawn from Italian national 
statistical office (ISTAT). All figures are collected on a regional 
basis. Italian administrative regions correspond to European NUTS 
II-level. First, as measure of crime, we use an index drawn from the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). It reports the 
number of burglaries and robberies per thousand of inhabitants. 
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Source:ISTAT 
 
Before focusing on the relation between crime and corruption, 
figures 1-5 present actual values of such index for whole Italy and 
its macro-regions for the period 1996-2004. There are, in fact, 
significant differences in the level of criminal activities among the 
Italian macro-regions. North-western regions present the highest 
number of reported crimes from 1996-2004. In these regions, despite 
a slight drop in the number of crimes reported in early 2000, the 
level of criminal activities has newly increased in the year 2004-
2005. 
 
 
Source: ISTAT 
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FIG.. 1:  CRIME IN ITALY 
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FIG. 2:  CRIME IN NORTH-WEST ITALY 
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Source: ISTAT 
 
The North-eastern region, instead, presents more irregular patterns 
in crime rate, as shows in the figure above. Despite, the general 
trend for the period 1996-2004 is positive, there has been a 
consistent decrease in the number of crimes reported from 1999 to 
2001. After this year, the rate of crime has risen once again. Central 
regions also present an increasing level of crime. In particular, the 
trend for the period 1996-2005, although being irregular, is 
increasing.  
 
 
Source: ISTAT 
 
Southern regions, on the other hand, show a declining trend in 
crime. The actual number of crimes reported has constantly 
declined from 1996 to 2005.  
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FIG. 3: CRIME IN NORTH-EAST ITALY  
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FIG.4: CRIME IN CENTRAL ITALY 
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Source: ISTAT 
 
As measure of corruption we use the number of regional 
government officials prosecuted for corrupt practices relative to the 
population. The crimes that we consider are based on the Libro II, 
Titolo II (crimes against the Public Administration) of the Italian 
Criminal Law as reported in the Annali di Statistiche Giudiziarie of 
the ISTAT (various issues) and they have been firstly used in an 
econometric study in Fiorino et al. (2012).   
In our analysis, the measure of corruption has been lagged of 
one year in order to consider the effect of past corruption on current 
crime. Moreover, we rule out the possibility of endogenous 
determination of both variables. The relationship between current 
crime and past corruption is showed in the scatter-plot diagram 
below. Both variables are logged. A positive correlation appears to 
be present. In the meantime, this scatter-plot suggests the 
possibility of a non linear relationship between crime and 
corruption.  
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FIG. 5: CRIME IN SOUTHERN ITALY 
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Then, let us start our empirical investigation with a linear model. 
Eventually we shall explore some non-linearities.  
Therefore, in what follows, we examine the main hypothesis of this 
work by using the following panel data model. The OLS estimator is 
applied.  
 
                               
 
where  
                       i                               and X 
denotes a set of covariates listed in Table 1 below. Most variables 
have been logged and one-year lagged. This is a simple way to avoid 
endogeneity.  
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Fig. 6: corruption and crime
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
(logged) 
Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Corruption, (t-1) 200 1952.71 1797.69 29 10087 
School 
participation 
rate, (t-1) 
280 4.492 .092 4.191 4.651 
Unemployment 
rate, (t-1) 
300 2.076 .576 .920 3.197 
Gross fixed 
investment, (t-1)  
300 9.106 1.028 6.595 11.067 
Public expenses 
in security, (t-1) 
402 6.641 1.039 4.093 8.262 
Patents 
registered at the 
EPO (t-1) 
297 3.420 1.197 -.142 5.281 
Percentage 
population 25-34 
years old 
270 2.695 .103 2.318 3.055 
Percentage 
population 65 
and over years 
old 
270 2.951 .152 
2.532 3.289 
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The choice of covariates follows the prevailing literature. The first 
covariate is a measure of education. In fact, the association between 
education and crime is perhaps the most evident. As stated by an 
established literature [see among others Groot and van den Brink 
(2010), Lochner and Moretti (2004), Soares (2004), Gould et al. 
(2002), Miron (2001), Grogger (1998) and Buonanno and Leonida 
(2006/2009) for the Italian case], education is negatively associated 
with crime. Interpretation in this respect is two-fold. Firstly, higher 
levels of school participation increase the opportunity cost of 
committing crime by providing better returns from licit activities. 
Secondly, educated people are likely to consider the consequences of 
committing crime more consistently than less educated people so 
reducing their willingness to do it.  Thirdly, someone maintains that 
a more educated society directly influences individual beliefs and 
preferences creating an ethic deterrent against crime. 
A second control variable is the level of unemployment. The level of 
unemployment has been frequently used as proxy to estimate the 
set of economic opportunities within a society. The higher is the 
level of unemployment, smaller is the set of economic licit 
opportunities. However, its association with crime is still 
controversial. According to a classical interpretation, there is a 
positive association between crime and unemployment. In this view, 
the number of unemployed people is a proxy indicator of the general 
economic condition of a society. In other words, the larger is the 
number of unemployed people, the higher is the probability that an 
individual is going to earn a living by illegal activities. Put 
differently, the larger is the set of economic opportunities, the lower 
is the likelihood that individuals would commit crimes. Therefore, it 
measures the opportunity cost of committing crime. (see Freeman, 
1999; Ehrlich, 1996, 1973). This hypothesis has found robust 
empirical evidence for property crime (Neumayer, 2005; Levitt, 
2001) On the other hand, there is also a significant group of studies, 
particularly in reference with violent crime, which analyze the 
relationship between crime and unemployment according to an 
opportunity perspective. According to this idea, unemployment is 
interpreted as a proxy of social activity and, as a consequence, a 
negative association with crime is predictable. In other words, it is 
supposed that unemployment reduces the level of social activity of 
individuals and, consequently, its opportunity of committing crime. 
Such hypothesis has been proposed for both property and violent 
crime (Cantor and Land, 1985), but some evidence is available only 
for violent crime (e.g. Saridakis 2004; Levitt, 2001; Entorf and 
Spengler, 2000). 
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Furthermore, we have also included the gross fixed investments as 
a proxy for future economic opportunities In fact, the volume of the 
gross fixed investments indicates how much the entrepreneurs are 
actually investing in a given region, so enlarging the set of future 
licit economic opportunities. A negative relationship between the 
level of investments and crime has been shown in in Caruso (2009) 
for the case of organised crime in Italy. Eventually, we consider also 
the number of patents registered at the European Patent Office 
(EPO). This could be a good proxy for the level of innovation. 
Needless to say, productive innovation also can be expected to 
enlarge the set of economic opportunities in the future. Therefore, 
the future set of economic opportunities increases the current 
opportunity cost of crime. As measure of deterrence we use the 
public spending in security. Nevertheless, an established strand of 
literature points out that deterrence is codetermined with crime and 
that, as a consequence, a problem of simultaneity occurs. That is, 
more deterrence can be caused by more crime. Therefore, there is no 
robust evidence of crime reduction in the presence of higher 
deterrence (Benson et al., 1994; Cameron, 1988; Cloninger and 
Sartorius, 1979; Corman et al., 1987).  Finally, we also take into 
account the association between crime and two groups of people, 
namely the quota of individuals who are between 25-34 years old 
and those being 65 and over. It is often maintained that crime 
declines with age. So controlling for age groups is common in 
literature on crime.  
 
 
Discussion of the results 
 
The results of the OLS regressions are reported in Tables 2-3 below. 
As mentioned above, the dependent variable is the number of 
property crime reported per thousand of inhabitants. The first 
column reports the simplest parsimonious uni-variate model. The 
other columns report different specifications with a set of 
covariates. 
The main finding is that corruption positively affects the level of 
crime. Precisely, an increase of 1% in past corruption is followed by 
a rise of 0.05% in the level of crime. In spite of the magnitude of the 
elasticity, this association is positive and statistically significant 
across different specifications. As far as the covariates are regarded, 
our results confirm the established findings presented in the 
mentioned literature. Education, in fact, is significantly and 
negatively associated with crime. An increase of 1% in school 
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participation causes a decrease of 0.5% in the rate of crime. The 
association between unemployment and crime, on the other hand, is 
not significant. Gross fixed investments are significantly and 
negatively associated with crime. In details, 1% million more in the 
volume of the investments is associated with a decrease of 0.4% in 
the crime rates. The number of patents registered at the European 
Patent Office, is not significant. Furthermore, crime and past public 
expenditure in security are significantly and positively associated. 
An increase of 1% more in the level of deterrence is associated with 
a rise of 1.2% in crime levels. This confirms the idea according to 
which crime and deterrence are co-determined. In particular, this 
seems to hold even across different periods.   
Finally, there is a significant and negative association between 
crime and the ratio of over 65 years old people to the total 
population. Specifically, an increase of 1% in the quota of elder 
people, drops crime rates of 1.3%. The association between the ratio 
of young adults to the total population is, instead, only weekly 
significant. Nevertheless, results show that if the percentage of 
young adults rises of 1%, crime levels rise by 0.7%. Results are 
confirmed if using the RE estimator in which dummy variables have 
been added for all regions.  
 
Tab. 2Results -  corruption and crime in Italy 1996-2005.  
  
1 
(FE) 
2 
(FE) 
3 
(FE) 
4 
(FE) 
5 
(FE) 
6 
(FE) 
7 
(FE) 
Corruption, t-1 .063*** .085*** 0.85*** .074*** .070*** .074*** .057** 
  .027 
.028 
0.28 .028 .028 .028 .028 
School participation rate at 
secondary level, t-1 
  
-.874*** -.875*** -.836*** -1.059*** -1.083*** -.561* 
    .325 .331 .326 .335 .333 .341 
Unemployment rate, t-1     .000 .005 -.002 -.017 -.017 
      .050 .049 .049 .048 .054 
Gross fixed investments, t-1       -.363*** -.390*** -.330*** -.433*** 
        .142 .141 .144 .143 
Public expenses in security, t-1         1.014*** 1.149*** 1.194*** 
          .425 .422 .429 
Patens registered at the 
European Patent Office, t-1 
  
        -.001 -.008 
            .020 .019 
Percentage of population 25-34 
years old 
  
          .708* 
              .423 
Percentage of population 65 
and over years old 
  
          -1.299*** 
              .430 
Time trend yes Yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Regional dummies no no no no no no no 
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Constant 2.520*** 6.195*** 6.197*** 9.335*** 3.390 2.605 2.789 
  .200 1.383 1.395 1.846 2.916 2.910 3.258 
Obs 200 200 200 200 200 198 178 
Groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 
R square within 0.034 0.072 0.072 0.105 0.133 0.141 0.212 
 R square between 0.298 0.193 0.192 0.512 0.006 0.020 0.000 
R square overall 0.277 0.186 0.185 0.473 0.006 0.021 0.001 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically 
significant coefficients are in bold. Standard Errors in parenthesis.   
 
Tab.3 - corruption and crime in Italy 1996-2005. - dependent variable: actual level of crime 
  
1 
(RE) 
2 
(RE) 
3 
(RE) 
4 
(RE) 
5 
(RE) 
6 
(RE) 
7 
(RE) 
        Corruption, t-1 .063*** .085*** .085*** .074*** 0.070*** .074*** .057** 
  .027 .028 .028 .028 0.028 .028 .028 
School participation rate at 
secondary level, t-1   -.874*** -.875*** -.836*** -1.059*** -1.083*** -.561* 
    .325 .331 .326 .335 .333 .341 
Unemployment rate, t-1     .000 .005 -.002 -.017 -.017 
      .050 .049 .049 .048 .054 
Gross fixed investments, t-1       -.363*** -.390*** -.330*** -.433*** 
        .142 .141 .144 .143 
Public expenses in security, 
t-1         1.014*** 1.149*** 1.194*** 
          .425 .442 .429 
Patens registered at the 
European Patent Office, t-1           -.001 -.008 
            .020 .019 
Percentage of population 25-
34 years old             .708 
              .423 
Percentage of population 65 
and over years old             1.299*** 
              .430 
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 3.064*** 6.775*** 6.435*** 8.638*** 6.051*** 5.124*** 5.464*** 
  .247 1.403 1.374 1.635 2.164 2.160 2.505 
Obs 200 200 200 200 200 198 178 
Groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 
R square within 0.034 0.072 0.072 0.105 0.133 0.141 0.212 
 R square between 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R square overall 0.955 0.957 0.957 0.958 0.960 0.961 0.966 
        Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically 
significant coefficients are in bold. Standard Errors in parenthesis.   
         
 
Robustness check: some nonlinearities  
 
So far we have assumed a linear association between corruption and 
crime. However, figure 6 above suggests also some non linear 
association between corruption and crime. Therefore, for sake of 
robustness, we investigate further the relationship between these 
two variables using the following model. 
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In doing so, we are testing the hypothesis that corruption does not 
affect crime levels proportionally but the higher the levels of 
corruption are, the greater is its impact on crime rates. The results, 
listed below in tables 4-5, give validity to our hypothesis. 
Interpretation of these results, however, is a slippery floor. In fact, 
the effect of corruption on crime turns to be not significant  
suggesting that at relatively low levels of corruption the predicted 
relationship does not appear to take shape. Put differently, low level 
of corruption does not provide enough information on our research 
inquiry. On the other hand, widespread corruption brings about a 
less restrained environment which boasts higher levels of crime. In 
details, we estimate that an increase of 1% in corruption rates 
causes a rise of 0.01% in crime level. 
 
Tab. 4 -  Corruption and crime in Italy 1996- 2005. 
   
 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
Corruption, t-1 -.132 -.077 -.165 
  .120 .120 .115 
Corruption, squared .015** .011 .015** 
  .008 .008 .008 
School participation rate at secondary level, 
t-1 
-.1086*** -.883*** -.029 
  .331 .334 .361 
Unemployment rate, t-1 -.024 .002 -3.701*** 
  .048 .048 1.282 
Gross fixed investments, t-1 -.267** -.264 -.369*** 
  .147 .145 .142 
Public expenses in security, t-1 1.099*** 3.322*** 3.081*** 
  .421 .931 .921 
Public expenses in security t-1, squared -.191*** -.191*** -.179*** 
  .071 .071 .073 
Patens registered at the European Patent 
Office, t-1 
-.015 -.020 -.028 
  .021 .021 .020 
Percentage of population 25-34 years old 
  
-1.925** 
  
  
.947 
Percentage of population 65 and over years 
old   
-.583 
   
.457 
Percentage of population 25-34 years old x 
Unemployment rate   
1.364*** 
  
  
.472 
Time trend yes yes yes 
Regional dummies no no no 
Constant 3.088 -4.144 1.367 
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  2.906 3.939 4.264 
Obs 198 198 178 
Groups 20 20 18 
R square within 0.157 0.191 0.295 
 R square between 0.302 0.009 0.003 
R square overall 0.031 0.011 0.001 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant 
coefficients are in bold. Standard Errors in parenthesis 
 
 
 
In addition, we also examine the presence of a non linear 
relationship between crime and public expenses in security. We 
assume that if low increases in the ratio of public expenses in 
security to GDP may be co-determined with crime so returning a 
positive association, conversely, significant increases in security 
expenses may lead to a drop in crime rates. Precisely, we calculate 
that raising the quota of public expenses in security to GDP leads to 
a decrease of about 0.2% in crime rates. Put differently, it seems 
that security spending affects negatively actual crime only when it 
surpasses a threshold.   
Finally we question the possibility of interactions between 
unemployment and the percentage of people being 25-34. In our 
baseline models, unemployment is not significant. However, 
introducing an interaction term between unemployment and 
percentage of young adults (25-34 years) relative to the total 
population, both unemployment and the interaction term turn to be 
significant. In particular, an increase of 1% in the number of 
unemployed people produces a decrease of 3.7% in the rate of crime 
so confirming the opportunity perspective expounded in the 
previous section. The interaction term between unemployment and 
the 25-34 age group shows a positive association with crime. 
Interpretation is clear-cut. People aged between 25-34 are more 
likely to commit crimes if unemployed. Evidently, the quota of 25-34 
age group on the total population turns to be negatively associated 
with crime. It is not simply the age which increases the likelihood of 
crime, but younger adults are more likely to commit crimes 
presumably if unemployed. This confirms the findings presented in 
Britt (1997). Otherwise the larger is the quota 25-34 years old 
people the lower is the level of actual crime. These results hold for 
both fixed effects and random effects estimation as shown in tables 
4 and 5.  
 
Tab. 5 
Results – corruption and crime in Italy 1995-2005  
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1 
(RE) 
2 
(RE) 
3 
(RE) 
Corruption, t-1 -.132 -0.077 -.165 
  .120 .120 .115 
Corruption, squared .015** .011 .015** 
  .008 .008 .008 
School participation rate at secondary 
level, t-1 
-1.086*** -.883*** -.029 
  .331 .334 .361 
Unemployment rate, t-1 -.024 .002 -3.701*** 
  .048 .048 1.282 
Gross fixed investments, t-1 -.267** -.264** -.369*** 
  .147 .145 .142 
Public expenses in security, t-1 -.015*** 3.322*** 3.081*** 
  .021 .931 .921 
Public expenses in security t-1, squared 
 
-.191*** -.179*** 
  
 
.071 .073 
Patens registered at the European 
Patent Office, t-1 
-.015 -.020 -.028 
  .021 .021 .020 
Percentage of population 25-34 years old 
  
-1.925** 
   
.947 
Percentage of population 65 and over  
years old   
-.583 
  
  
.457 
Percentage of population 25-34 years old 
x Unemployment rate   
1.364*** 
  
  
.472 
Time trend yes yes yes 
Regional dummies yes yes yes 
Constant 5.593*** -1.578 3.642 
  2.159 3.411 3.787 
Obs 198 198 178 
Groups 20 20 18 
R square within 0.157 0.191 0.295 
 R square between 1.000 1.000 1.000 
R square overall 0.962 0.964 0.970 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability 
statistically significant coefficients are in bold. Standard Errors in parenthesis 
 
Summary of the results 
 
In conclusion, our empirical analysis has confirmed our hypothesis. 
Corruption and crime are correlated. In particular, it seems that 
corruption increases future crime. Main empirical findings have 
shown that: 
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1. There is a robust and positive association between crime and 
corruption. As pointed out by Kugler et al. (2005) crime and 
corruption appear to be complements. In particular, we are 
interested in verifying that corruption reinforces crime. An increase 
of 1% in corruption levels produces an increase of 0.05% in crime 
levels. However, we also find out that the relationship between 
corruption and crime appears to be non-linear. That is, the higher 
the levels of corruption are, the greater is its impact on crime rates.  
2. There is a robust and negative association between crime and 
education.  Raising of 1% in school participation reduces crime of  
0.5% 
3. There is significant and positive relationship between the ratio of 
public expenses in security to GDP and crime. Nevertheless, 
supposing a non linear relationship between these two variables, we 
find out that greater levels in security expenses, instead, drop 
crime. 
4. There is a robust and negative association between crime and the 
volume of fixed gross investment. Raising the volume of gross fixed 
investment of 1% generates a decrease of 0.4%. in crime rates. That 
is, perceived future economic opportunities reduce crime.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The main novelty we would claim for this work is the empirical 
evidence of a positive association between past level of corruption 
and current level of crime. That is, corruption and crime appear to 
reinforce each other. This result constitutes further evidence on the 
detrimental impact of corruption on economic development of 
societies. Moreover, the clear-cut negative association between 
crime and investments confirm the detrimental impact of illicit 
behaviors on economic development. These results shed new light 
on an illicit phenomenon that is widespread in Italy.  
Further research should analyze more in details the impact of 
corruption on long-run determinants of economic growth. In fact, 
since corruption divert public investments towards sectors where 
short-term returns can emerge, public investments in education and 
related sectors are lowered so affecting negatively future level of 
innovation and labor productivity.   
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